In New York City the high school a student attends is mediated primarily by an algorithm. This algorithm assumes no student would prefer, over their matched program, another one that would be willing to accept them. Each school has preferences over students, too, determined by priorities including grades and test scores. Despite this flexibility, the system does not deliver on its promise of choice. Students of color and lower socioeconomic status undermatch or match to programs lower in quality than the highest quality program they would have been accepted to had they applied. Providing students with information about school quality and altering how schools prioritize students may reduce undermatching. With this award, Garg will explore informational interventions to reduce opportunity access gaps. Sarah Cohodes, Associate Professor of Public Policy at the University of Michigan, will provide mentorship on evaluating informational interventions in schools. Parag Pathak, Professor of Economics at MIT, will provide mentorship in working with NYC schools to design choice systems.
Can an informational intervention increase access for disadvantaged students to attend high-quality schools in New York City? What policies should schools pursue to increase access to opportunity?